117295

The Struggle for American Independence

The Struggle

>• American Independence

By

Sydney George JFisher

Author of u The Making of Pennsylvania," ** Men, Women, and Manners

in Colonial Times,'* u The True Benjamin

Franklin,'* etc.

ILLUSTRATED

Vol. II.

Philadelphia & London

J. B. Lippincott Company

1908 BY J". B. LlPPXNCOTT COMPANY

Electrotyped and Printed by JT. JS. Lippincott Company J7/e Washington Square Pretts, Philadelphia, U. & A.

CONTENTS

VOLUME II

CHAPTER FA&E

LIIL THE QUIET SPRING OF 1777 1

LIV. T&E BATTLE OP BRANDYWINE 10

LV. THE STRUGGLE FOB THE SCHUYLKILL 30

LVI. THE BATTLE OP GERMANTOWN 37

LVII. THE DEFENCE OF RED BANK AND FORT MIPFLIN 42

LVIII. BURGOYNE SWEEPS DOWN FROM CANADA 56

LIX. HOWE'S DEFENCE OF His ABANDONMENT OF BURGOYNE 67 LX. BURGOYNE'S DEFEAT AT FORT STANWIX AND AT BEN-

NINGTON 77

LXI. THE Two BATTLES OF SARATOGA 85

LXIL THE SURRENDER 98

LXIII. BURGOYNE'S RECEPTION IN ENGLAND 106

LXIV. THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 113

LXV. ANOTHER QUIET WINTER AND SPRING 122

LXVL THE MISCHIANSSA 139

LXVIL LAFAYETTE'S NARROW ESCAPE AT BARREN HILL 144

LXVIIL GENERAL HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND, Atfb His CON- DUCT OF THE WAR is INVESTIGATED 149

LXIX. THE BRITISH MAKE THEIR LAST SUPREME EFFORT FOR

COMPROMISE 158

LXX. CLINTON ABANDONS PHILADELPHIA AND FIGHTS THE

BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 174

LXXL LEE'S CONDUCT AND TRIAL 189

LXXIL THE CONDITION OF PHILADELPHIA; THE MASSACRE OF

WYOMING AND THE TAKING OF KASKASKIA 198

LXXIII. THE FRENCH FLEET FAILS AT NEW YO&K AND AT NEW- PORT 206

LXXIV. CLINTON RAIDS THE NoRfif AKTD STRIKES HEAVILY IN THE

FRENCH WEST INDIES 218

LXXV. GEORGIA SUBJUGATED AND PROCLAIMED A BRITISH

COLONY 228

LXXVI. CLINTON RAIDS VIRGINIA AND CONNECTICUT 235

LXXVIL THE ALLIANCE WITH SPAIN, AND THE BON HOMME RICH- ARD AND SERAPIS 246

LXX VIII. THE BRITISH ESTABLISH A POST IN MAINE AND THE

FRENCH FAIL TO TAKE SAVANNAH ? . . , 256

V

CONTENTS

CHAPTER FAO8

LXXIX. THE FALL OF CHARLESTON U01

LXXX. SOUTH CAROLINA CONQUERED AND GREAT REJOICING IN

ENGLAND -70

LXXXL NEW JERSEY INVADED, GIBRALTAR RELIEVED AND KN<;-

IAND AGAIN SUCCESSFUL IN THE WEST INDIKH. ,,.,,.,. 271)

LXXXII. THE FRENCH FLEET AND ARMY LOCKED IT IN NAKRAUAN-

SETT BAY , 285

LXXXIII. THE DISASTER AT CAMDEN 205

LXXXIV. ARNOLD'S CONSPIRACY 302

LXXXV. TRAITORS AND DOUBLE SPIES , , . , tf IIJ

LXXXVI. HOLLAND JOINS IN THE WAR, THE SUBJUGATION OF tforTH

CAROLINA AND THE MEDIATION OF RUNHIA. 328

LXXXVII. CORNWALLIS BEGINS TO BREAK UP CLINTON *H POLICY . , . 336

LXXXVIII. THE BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN 349

LXXXIX. THE RIFLEMEN HANG NINE OF THKIK PKISONKKH, , . , .'MX)

XC. THE RETREAT OF CORNWALLIS AND GKKBNK'H I)AUIX<»

STRATEGY 3f>7

XCI. THE BATTLE OF COWPENS 3S2

XCII. THE DASH ACROSS NORTH CAROLINA 392

XCIIL GREENE STOPS THE RISING OF THE LOYALXHTB 401

XCIV. THE BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUKK , 406

XCV. CORNWALLIS RETREATS TO WILMINGTON AND AHANIX>N,H

SOUTH CAROLINA , , 412

XCVI. THE CAROLINAS IN A STATE OF ANARCHY , 417

XCVII. GREENE LOSES THE BATTLE OF HOHK.IKK HILL 4*J4

XCVIII. THE FALL OF AUGUSTA AND NINETY-SIX , , . . 432

XCIX. THE BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS CONFIX EH THE BKITIHH

TO THE SEAPORTS 430

C. THE SCENE SHIFTS TO VIRGINIA 446

CI. CORNWALLIS RETIRES TO YORKTOWN ,,,.,*....,, 4<>3

Oil. THE ATTACK UPON NEW YORK CHANGED TO AN ATTACK

UPON YORKTOWN 471

CIIL THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN 402

CIV. THE EFFECT OF THE FALL OF YORKTOWN AND OK THK

LOSS OF EUSTATIUS, MINORCA AND $T. CHRIHTOI'HKK . , f>OI

CV. BRITISH NAVAL SUPERIORITY RESTORED BY KODNKY'K

VICTORY AT GUADALOUPE 511

CVI. FIRST ATTEMPTS AT PEACE f»2i

CVII. SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER OF THE OVERTURES FOR ?KA<:B. . a2.s

CVIII. A PROVISIONAL TREATY WITH ENGLAND is SECURED 53(>

CIX. PARLIAMENT OVERTHROWS THE RHELBUHNE MINIHTHY

FOR MAKING THE TREATY , 540

CX. THE EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION ON KNGLAND'S CO- LONIAL SYSTEM &&*

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME II

PAGE

House in which Baroness Riedesel took refuge. From a picture in the collection of Mr. Julius F. Sachse of Philadelphia 98

Surrender of Burgoyne from a sketch by a German officer. From the original in the collection of Mr. Julius F. Sachse of Philadelphia 102

A call for Sailors for Paul Jones. From the copy in the collection of the Essex Institute at Salem, Mass 252

Old Engraving of Gordon Riots in London 276

Portrait of De Grasse. Engraved by Geoffroy; but whether it is any- thing of a likeness is not known. From the Bradford Club's " Opera- tions of the French Fleet under the Count de Grasse. " 480

Old French Engraving of the Surrender of Cornwallis. From the col- lection of Mr. J. E. Barr, of Philadelphia 498

Old French Engraving of the Siege of Fort St. Phillipe in Minorca. From the collection of Mr. J. E. Barr, of Philadelphia 508

Old French Engraving of the Siege of Brimstone Hill, in St. Chris- topher. From the collection of Mr. J. E. Barr, of Philadelphia 512

Old French Engraving of the Surrender of Admiral de Grasse, From the collection of Mr. J, E. Barr, of Philadelphia 518

MAPS

Map of the Battle of Brandywme 23

Map of the Battle of Germantown 37

Map of River Defences of Philadelphia 42

Map of Burgoyne's Campaign 63

Map of Clinton's Retreat across New Jersey 178

Map of Admiral Howe's Defence of New York 208

Map of the West Indies 224

Map of British Occupation of South Carolina 374

Map of the Wandering Campaign of Cornwallis 468

The Struggle

for

American Independence

LIIL

THE QUIET SPRING OF 1777

HOWE'S abandonment of New Jersey without a struggle and settling down quietly in New York until the end of May, astonished every one. Washington fully expected him to make some capital stroke during the winter. In fact, there were several obvious expeditions any one or all of which a vigorous general with such a large force at his command would have undertaken.1

He could have attacked the remains of "Washington's army at Morristown and captured or scattered it. He could have taken Philadelphia very easily in January when the upper Delaware was frozen. He could have sent a force to the South to take Georgia, as was done a couple of years afterwards by his successor, General Clinton. But Howe was interested in none of these warlike enterprises and went to sleep for the whole winter, like a bear.

The huge armada which had been sent across the ocean to conquer America had, in the hand of its general, become worse than a failure. It was a farce. Boston had been abandoned in the first year of the war to gain New York, and an outpost at Newport in the second, leaving the rest of the country as independent as ever. The patriots could ignore the occupation

1 Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 4, 5, 182. Vol. II— 1 1

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

of New York and go on conducting their national and com- mercial life independently of it.

There was only one method of conquering America, the method which modern British generals have always had so clearly in mind; and that was to attack and utterly destroy the organized army of the enemy by defeating it in battle, relentlessly pursuing it, devastating the country which gave it support, capturing and imprisoning or executing the heads of the political party which directed the army and guided the sentiment of the people, capturing also large numbers of the patriot people themselves, destroying all their provisions and means of livelihood, and imprisoning the women and children to compel the submission of the men still at large. One can understand that such methods as these might have given Great Britain and the loyalists the military and political control of the Atlantic seaboard states, with the remnant of the patriot party seeking a precarious refuge in the western wilderness."2

But Howe pursued the reverse of this course. Instead of continuously following up the patriots and wearing them out, he gave them long periods of rest, for six or nine months, which exactly suited their purposes; for their militia would not keep the field continuously, and were willing to serve only for short periods and special occasions.

In March Washington's force at Morristown, and its out- posts, had sunk to less than three thousand effectives, and Gordon gives his numbers as at times only fifteen hundred, all told, and relates a tradition that once when he could not muster more than four hundred he had to obtain patriot citi- zens of prominence to do duty as sentinels at his doors. Wash- ington expressed the greatest surprise that Howe took no advantage of this weakness. "All winter," he says, "we were at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against

* American Archives, fifth series, vol. iii, p. 1424.

2

THE PATRIOT FORCES

us." Washington thought that Howe must be ignorant of the real situation; and Boudinot gives a curious account of the efforts to deceive the British commander.

Washington had spread out his men, two or three to a house all along the main roads for miles round Morristown, so that the country people got the impression that he was 40,000 strong. The adjutant had in the pigeon holes of his desk what purported to be correct returns giving a force of 12,000. He invited to his office a person known to be a British spy, left him alone there for some time; and the copy of the returns which the spy took to New York is supposed to have con- vinced Howe that the patriot numbers were at least respectable.3

If he was really deceived in this way, with such ample opportunities to learn the real situation from the loyalists, it is very extraordinary. To the loyalists it seemed that the Ameri- can army was "mouldering away like a rope of sand." They could not understand why Howe did not sally out from New York and capture it, or if it should fly from him scatter it, break up its organization, destroy its supplies and baggage, and do this every time it came near him. To allow it to do as it pleased, disband itself and come together again within a few miles of him, was inexplicable.

The patriot scouts and wandering parties were constantly picking off foragers and stragglers from the British posts at New Brunswick and Amboy; and Galloway remarked in one of his pamphlets, that they killed more regulars in that way than Howe would have lost by surrounding, assaulting or starving out the patriot force at Morristown.

The thirteen states, except the towns of New York and Newport, were enjoying perfect independence and self-govern- ment and were as free from British or any foreign interference

"Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, p. 264; vol. viii, pp. 394, 502, 503, 504; Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, pp. 422; Bancroft, "History of the United States," edition 1686, vol. r, p. 148; J. J. Boudinot, "Life of Boudinot," vol. i, pp. 72-74.

3

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

as they are to-day. This, in itself, was a great advantage; for every month's and every day's enjoyment of independence deepened the love of it, and the determination to maintain it.

In passing through New Jersey, the British and Hessians had committed many outrages on the inhabitants, without even distinguishing between patriot and loyalist. The people had generally remained in their hom.es, which was the invariable custom during the first three years of the Revolution, under the avowed policy of the Ministry not to devastate, but only to fight battles between organized forces. In fact, the non- combatant portion of the population often crowded round as spectators of many of the early battles. But the Hessians were great plunderers; their officers made no attempt to restrain them; and the British officers excused the crime by saying that it was the Hessian way of fighting. "When loyalists showed the protection certificates they had received from Gen- eral Howe, the Hessians could not read them. They went on with their robberies more vigorously than ever ; and the British soldiers not wishing to see the Hessians get all the booty, joined them in their crimes. A British officer after plundering a venerable blind gentleman of everything in his house, made sure of his own immortality by writing on the door: "Capt. Wills of the Royal Irish did this."

These outrages were accompanied by a perfect carnival of rape, which so maddened the patriot farmers that they or- ganized themselves in small bands which watched for every British straggler or forager from Amboy and Brunswick and were not inclined to show much mercy. Impartial history, however, compels us to record that the patriot troops under Washington, being short of supplies of every sort, also took to indiscriminate plundering under the pretence that their victims were always loyalists. Between the depredations of the two armies there was something very like a reign of terror in New Jersey. The British were compelled to withdraw their small outposts from Elizabeth and Newark ; and Washington, after an order to stop his own men from plundering, issued

4

A TIME OF TRIUMPH

a triumphant proclamation calling on all who had taken the British oath of allegiance or had certificates of protection, to deliver up the certificates and take the oath to the United States.4

It was a time of triumph; and the patriots were so elated that they thought they might successfully attack the British army in New York. Possibly the southern troops had been gaining such success and prestige in New Jersey that the New Englanders felt that they also must do something for their reputations. Towards the end of January, about four thou- sand New England and New York militia under Generals Heath, Wooster, Parsons and Lincoln, camped before Fort Independence near Kingsbridge on the upper end of Man- hattan Island, and demanded its surrender. The fort might possibly have been carried by assault ; but Heath was too cau- tious and after some ten days of threatening and capturing of loyalists and their property in the neighborhood, he withdrew.3

At sea in their privateering and naval ventures this spring, the patriots were very successful. The great fleet of mer- chantmen that annually sailed from England's important colony of Jamaica, had been delayed by the discovery of a conspiracy among the negroes of that island. When they finally sailed the vessels were scattered by a storm and in their isolated defenceless condition fell an easy prey to the Ameri- can rovers. Our privateersmen could now sell their prizes openly in the French and Spanish ports of the West Indies and also in the European ports of those nations by having the sale take place just outside of the harbor. There never has been a time since then when the great powers of Europe were so hostile to England and so willing to take action against her in every possible way. No other independence-loving people re- sisting the British empire have ever had the advantage of

* American Archives, fifth series, vol. iii, pp. 1188, 1376, 1487; Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, p. 414.

"Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 178, 191, 206, 214, 217; Gordon, "American Revolution," pp. 419, 420; Heath, Memoirs, pp. 99-105.

5

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

being able to fit out hundreds of privateers and sell their prizes in European ports.0

In March, 1777, Howe aroused himself sufficiently to allow Colonel Bird to go up the Hudson to Peekskill with some five hundred troops, drive out the Americans under McDougall and burn the patriot magazines and storehouses containing im- mense supplies of provisions and military equipment. Wash- ington had given special warning not to leave depots of val- uable material near to navigable water ; and it was strange that the British had left Peekskill so long unmolested.7

In this same month the ceremony of conferring on General Howe the Order of the Bath given him in England for the victory at Long Island, was performed in New York, possibly the only occasion when this foreign order was ever conferred upon any one on American soil. Judge Jones sarcastically described it as,

"A reward for evacuating Boston, for lying indolent upon Staten Island for near two months, for suffering the whole rebel army to escape him upon Long Island, and again at the White Plains; for not putting an end to rebellion in 1776, when so often in his power; for making such injudicious cantonments of his troops in Jersey as he did, and for suffering 10,000 veterans under experienced generals, to be cooped up in Brunswick, and Amboy, for nearly six months, by about 6,000 militia, under the command of an inexperienced general." (Jones, "Revolution in New York," vol. i, p. 177.)

In April Howe showed no signs of breaking his repose in New York ; but Cornwallis, who commanded the posts at Amboy and New Brunswick, became at last aware that he had close at hand an opportunity for avenging Princeton. Some five hundred patriots under General Lincoln were encamped in a very exposed position at Bound Brook; and at daybreak on

"Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, p. 433 ; Hted- man, "American War," vol. i, p. 259.

T Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, p. 297 note; Jones, " New York in the Revolution," vol. ii, p. 177 ; Gordon, " American Revolu- tion," edition 1788, vol. ii, p. 423; Stedman, "American War" vol i p. 278. '

6

THE DANBURY ENTERPRISE

the 13th of April, Cornwallis with 2000 men had advanced with- in two hundred yards and had begun to surround them before they discovered their danger. Lincoln had just time to leave his house before the enemy entered it; but he succeeded in rushing out his whole force between the two columns of the British before they closed on him. He lost three pieces of artillery and sixty men; but the most serious loss was his papers which furnished the enemy with valuable information. All things considered, however, he was very lucky, and noth- ing but his alertness saved the whole command from capture.8

A few days afterwards Howe sent Governor Tryon and two thousand men to follow up the success of the Bird expedition, and seize a depot of patriot supplies at Danbury, Connecticut. Tryon, who was accompanied by Generals Agnew and Erskine to supply him, it is said, with military knowledge, landed on the shore of Long Island Sound between Fairfield and Norwalk, successfully reached Danbury twenty-three miles in the interior and destroyed hundreds of tons of provisions.

The Bird expedition had been entirely by water and on that account was easily successful. But it was a question whether a raid far into the interior like this Danbury enter- prise could be safely conducted. The test of the enterprise would come on the return over that twenty-three miles to their ships in the sound.

The patriot militia were assembling from the neighboring country and Generals Wooster and Arnold, now returned from their adventures in Canada, were in command. "Wooster with about two hundred men attacked the rear of the British as they returned, and succeeded in taking about forty prisoners ; but was mortally wounded. Arnold in his heroic manner got in front of the enemy, and entrenched himself with five hundred men across the road with his right covered by a barn and his

8 Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, p. 462; G. W. Greene, "Life of Nathanael Greene," vol. i, p. 362; Boudinot's Journal, p. 66; J. J, Boudinot, " Life of Boudinot," vol. i, p. 50.

7

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

left by a ledge of rock. There was a close action for some minutes, but the British got possession of the ledge of rocks and Arnold's men were forced to retreat.

A whole platoon of regulars fired at Arnold within thirty yards and, as usual with English marksmen, every ball missed its aim except one which killed his horse. As Arnold fell with the horse he drew his pistols from the holsters, shot the first soldier that ran up to bayonet him, and escaped.

It was a question now whether the retreat would be a dis- astrous one like that from Lexington and Concord, when the British were pursued and slaughtered all the way back to Boston. But the British officers had learned something. They followed a ridge of hills where they could not be ambuscaded, or fired upon from stone walls; and although the Americans followed and used artillery, Arnold's utmost exertions could make no great impression. The British easily escaped to their ships and by their own account their losses were trifling.9

In May the Connecticut patriots saw a chance to be revenged for this Danbury expedition. General Parsons or- ganized an attack upon a British foraging party which had ventured out to Sag Harbor at the extreme eastern end of Long Island, and was protected by part of DeLancey's regiment of loyalists. The command of the patriot expedition was given Colonel Jonathan Meigs, who had served with Arnold in the attack on Quebec. Meigs started from New Haven and crossed the sound with about one hundred and seventy men in whaleboats, arrived near Sag Harbor on the evening of the 23rd of May, and made a night attack at two o'clock in the morning. DeLancey's loyalists were completely taken by surprise, and all but six of them were captured. Without having lost a man Meigs destroyed all the forage, brigs and sloops with a large quantity of supplies. In going and coming

•Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, p. 463; Jones, "New York in the Revolution," vol. i, p. 178; Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 346 note, 439; Stedman, "American War," vol. i, p. 279.

8

MEIGS'S SUCCESSFUL EXPEDITION

he had covered a distance of nearly one hundred miles in eighteen hours.10

It was evidently unsafe for Howe to have any weak out- lying posts or foraging parties. His successor, Clinton, avoided having any of these outposts; but conducted many raids like that of Tryon to Danbury.

10 Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, p. 398; Gordon, " American Revolution," edition 1788, vol ii, p. 468 ; Jones, " New York in the Revolution/' vol. i, pp. 180, 183, 184; Stedman, "American War," p. 282.

LIV.

THE BATTLE OF THE BEANDYWINE

IN the spring of 1777 the first assistance from France arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and consisted of several cargoes of powder, cannon, muskets, clothes, and shoes sufficient for 25,000 troops. This had been sent out in secret by the French Government through the brilliant and adven- turous Beaumarchais, the young watch-maker, writer of plays, and intimate friend of the daughters of the King, who had established what in appearance was the mercantile house of Roderigue Hortalez & Company. Furnished with money by the French Government and allowed to take from the French arsenals supplies in small quantities at a time so as not to attract attention, he was able to send across the ocean, ap- parently as a private merchant, the commodities most needed by the patriot Americans. To hoodwink the British and carry on this romantic sort of business for more than a year would seem to be a chimerical sort of project, and yet it was accomplished.

He was to be paid for the supplies by return cargoes of tobacco and provisions furnished by the Congress, which had no specie money, but could obtain articles like tobacco and $our by purchase with paper money or as gifts from the States as their contribution to the cause. But letters from Arthur Lee led the Congress to suppose that the Beaumarchais cargoes were gifts, and the Congress became short in payment to him in some 3,000,000 francs, which was not finally settled until 1835 by an allowance of 800,000 francs to his daughter.1

1Lomenie, "Life of Beaumarchais;" Durand, "New Material for History of American Revolution," pp. 107, 151, 156; Still6, "Beau- marchais and the Lost Million."

10

HOWE IN NEW JERSEY

In May, 1777, Washington thought that General Howe would surely begin some active campaigning; and he accord- ingly left Morristown and placed the patriot force in a strong position some ten miles from New Brunswick at Middlebrook, whence he could follow and annoy any British force that might march towards Philadelphia.

The patriot soldiers were slowly returning from their homes and again joining the army ; but there were as yet very few of them. In one sense this made little difference, for on the first of June Howe was waiting for the arrival of tents and field equipage, and had shown no signs of stirring from New York. On the 13th, however, he landed a force of eleven thousand men in New Jersey, provided with boats and rafts, as if he intended to march to the Delaware and so cross to Philadelphia. But he advanced only a few miles beyond New Brunswick, where he occupied a position about nine miles in length from Somerset Court House to Middle Bush, and he strengthened this line with redoubts. As he left all his boats and heavy baggage in New Brunswick, Washington judged that he had no intention of forcing his way towards Phila- delphia.

This movement by Howe into New Jersey became the subject of much discussion in England, and his purpose and motives were severely criticised. Washington believed that his object was to destroy the American army, which was now seven thousand strong, and with that disposed of cross the Delaware and reach Philadelphia. He could more easily have destroyed the American force during the winter. Even now its seven thousand men were no match for his eleven thousand regulars in the open field. But entrenched in the strong position in which Washington had placed them, the patriot troops, if at- tacked, would have inflicted a heavy Bunker Hill loss on their enemy.

Washington expected such an attack and supposed it would be made on his right flank, which was his weakest point. Howe was unsparingly denounced by his military critics, especially Galloway and Stedman, for not making this attack, which they

11

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

said would have been surely successful and well worth the heavy loss he would have sustained. If he had not men enough with him he could have brought more from New York to ac- complish such an important object.

In defending himself from this charge, Howe simply said that he considered it inadvisable to attack Washington. "I must necessarily have made a considerable circuit of the country, and having no prospect of forcing him, I did not think it advisable to lose so much time as must have been employed upon that march, during the intense heat of the season."

Why then was he out there in New Jersey in "the intense heat of the season " with an army of eleven thousand men for two weeks? Merely, it seems, to see if Washington could be persuaded to attack him. He made the movement, he says, "with a view of drawing on an action if the enemy should have descended from his post, and been tempted towards the Delaware, in order to defend the passage of the river on a supposition that I intended to cross it."2

It is strange that he should have supposed Washington to be a man of such poor judgment. But Howe's reasons and explanations are always hard to understand. He remained in his strong position between Somerset Court House and Middle Bush for five days, and then returned with his army to New Brunswick and Amboy. Washington was at a loss to account for this move, but thought that possibly Howe had been led to abandon the attack by hearing that the New Jersey militia were rallying to the American army in larger numbers than had been expected.

Light troops of Greene's and Wayne's brigades with Mor- gan's riflemen followed Howe in his retreat; and Washington ;at first thought that they had not been able to inflict any damage of consequence. But he afterwards reported that the British loss was considerable and that they had not suffered so severely since the Battle of Princeton.

Although the intentions of the British commander seemed

8 Howe's "Narrative/' pp. 15, 16.

12

FOOLING IN NEW JERSEY

obscure, his manoeuvres were so harmless that Washington moved nearer to him and took post at Quibbletown. Howe sent all his heavy baggage over to Staten Island, followed by a considerable number of troops, as if he were giving up the game. But the next day his troops all returned and he marched suddenly from Amboy into New Jersey in two columns, with the apparent intention, as Washington supposed, to cut off Stirling's division and gain the high ground on the American left. This movement was partly successful, for Stirling's division was nearly cut off and lost some of its artillery. But Washington's main force retreated to the high ground. Both sides claimed the advantage. The loss in Stirling's division was not considered serious by the patriots and they believed that the British lost heavily in the skirmishing.

Howe, in his "Narrative," insisted that he had outwitted his enemy. But it was a very trifling advantage he had gained with eleven thousand against seven thousand. He remained on the ground one day, and then, returning to Amboy, he evacuated New Jersey entirely, and never entered it again. On the 30th of June, after his "two weeks fooling in New Jersey," as it was called in England, all his troops were taken over to Staten Island, and to the amazement of every one he began loading them on transports as if to leave America.3

People in England were the more impatient with Howe because they expected the campaign of this year 1777 to be a very decisive one, which would make up for Trenton and Princeton and all the shortcomings of 1776. The Ministry were preparing to support Howe by an expedition sent down the Hudson from Canada which should meet at Albany a force under Howe coming up from New York. The water highway

'Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 436, 439, 440, 444, 445, 448, 450, 452-455. See also Galloway, "Letters to a Nobleman," &c., pp, 62, 67; " Remarks on General Burgoyne's State of the Expedition from Canada," p. 39, London, 1780; Stedman, "American War/' yol. i, p. 238; Gordon, "American Revolution," edition 1788, vol. ii, pp. 469-474; "Life of George Reed," p. 268; Graham, "Life of General Morgan," p. 124; Drake, "Life of General Knox," p. 44.

13

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

of the Hudson and Lake Champlain was to pass over to British control throughout its whole length and the rebellious colonies were to be cut in half and prevented from supporting one another.

As the plan was worked out, two expeditions were to come from Canada ; one under Burgoyne was to come straight down by way of Lake Champlain, and a smaller force under St. Leger was to go up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario as far as Oswego, capture Fort Stanwix, and sweep down the Mohawk Valley to reinforce Burgoyne at Albany. New York being peopled only along the lines of the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, these two expeditions, reinforced by Howe from below, would be a complete conquest of New York. The plan also included an attack upon the coast of New England to prevent the militia and minute-men of that part of the country from being massed against Burgoyne as he came down from Canada.

Howe had full information as to this plan, professed to approve of it, and, in his letter to the colonial secretary on the 9th of October, 1776, spoke of it as "the primary object." It was evidently necessary and vital that he should play his part in it with vigor, or there would be a wof ul disaster to the British arms and great encouragement to the rebellion, as well as encouragement to France to ally herself with the patriots. In a letter to the Ministry of the 30th of November, 1776, Howe shows how he will carry out his part of the plan by sending 10,000 men to attack New England, 10,000 to go up the Hudson to Albany, and 8000 to make a diversion towards Philadelphia.4

This plan he gradually changed until nothing of it was left but the movement to Philadelphia. His reason for this change was that the Ministry would not send him sufficient reinforce- ments to carry out the plan. But this was hardly a sufficient excuse for refusing to send any assistance at all to Burgoyne. On the 5th of April, 1777, he wrote to Carleton in Canada that he would not assist Burgoyne, because it would be inconsistent

4 Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, 1779, vol. xi, pp. 261, 362; American Archives, fifth series, vol. iii, pp. 926, 1318.

14

HOWE AND BURGOYNE

with other operations on which he had determined; that he would be in Pennsylvania when Burgoyne was advancing on Albany, and Burgoyne must take care of himself as best he could.5

A copy of this letter to Carleton was sent by Howe to the Ministry, and about a month afterwards the Ministry sent to Carleton instructions for sending Burgoyne to Albany, and directed that Burgoyne and St. Leger should communicate with Howe and receive instructions from him; that until they received instructions from him they should act as exigencies might require; "but that in so doing they must never lose sight of their intended junction with Sir William Howe as their principal object."6

A copy of these instructions from the Ministry to Carleton was sent to Howe for his guidance, and received by him on the 5th of July, so that as commander-in-chief with discretionary power he was made aware of the whole situation, knew the wishes and plans of the Ministry, and on him was placed the responsibility of effecting or not effecting a junction with Burgoyne.7

In accordance with the instruction from the Ministry, Bur- goyne, before starting from England, wrote to Howe. He wrote to him again from Quebec, and again on the 2nd of July, when on his way down Lake Champlain, informing him of the nature of his expedition, that he was under orders to effect a junction, and that he expected support from the South. This letter of the 2nd of July Howe received on the 15th of July.8

In order that discretionary power and responsibility might be entirely cast upon Howe, Lord George Germain wrote to him, on the 18th of May, saying that the copy of Howe's letter

8 Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, 1779, vol. xi, p. 389. *lUd., p. 404. 7 Hid., pp. 405, 407.

8Cobbett, "Parliamentary History," vol. xx, pp. 786, 788, 798; Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, 1779, vol. xiii, pp. 92, 93,

127-129.

15

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

to Carleton changing the plan of a junction with Burgoyne had been received, and adding:

"As you must, from your situation and military skill, be a com- petent judge of the propriety of every plan, his Majesty does not hesitate to approve the alterations which you propose; trusting, however, that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itself under your command." (Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, 1779, vol. xi, p. 416.)

This letter was received by Howe on the 16th of August, and on the 30th of August he replied to it, saying that he would not be able to cooperate with Burgoyne.9 The corre- spondence was now closed ; and this brief review of it may be of assistance in understanding the events which are to be related.

On the 17th of June, when Howe was manoeuvring so strangely with Washington in New Jersey, Burgoyne started from Canada and began to fight his way down the lakes toward Albany. On the first of July, as we have just seen, Howe began to load his troops on transports; and the great question was what he would do next.

The strategical importance of the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain to Canada was so well known in America, and it was so well known that England attached great importance to it, that every one supposed that Howe would move up towards Albany to assist the Canada expedition. On the 2nd of July, Washington learned that this Canada expedition was moving on Ticonderoga ; and a few days afterwards he heard that Ticonderoga was taken.10 This would seem to have been the nick of time for Howe to go to the support of Burgoyne ; but Howe's movements were uncertain tod mysterious. Sometimes he seemed about to go up the Hudson; at other times he appeared to be going into Long Island Sound to attack New England; and these uncertain movements continued during

9 Parliamentary Register, House of Commons, p. 418.

10 Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 459, 461, 462, 467, 469, 472, 475, 501-503, 517, 520.

16

HOWE LEAVES NEW YORK

nearly the whole month of -July. His troops during all that time were kept on board the transports ; and the whole fleet of nearly 300 vessels kept moving back and forth between New York and Sandy Hook.

Washington felt sure that he must intend to assist Bur- goyne. It seemed impossible to think otherwise; impossible to suppose that his uncertain movements were anything but feints to cover his real design of effectually cooperating with the army from Canada. But, finally, after all his manoeuvring, Howe on the 24th of July, took his force of 18,000 men out to sea. Clinton was left in command of New York with the rest of the British army, consisting of about 6000, a force entirely inade- quate to hold New York and at the same time cooperate with Burgoyne and St. Leger.

Just before sailing from New York, Howe sent a letter to Burgoyne which he carefully arranged should fall into the hands of Washington, for he gave it to be carried by a patriot prisoner, whom he released and gave a large sum of money, as if he really believed that such a person would prove a faith- ful messenger. In this letter he said that he was making a feint at sea to the southward, but that his real intention was to sail to Boston, and from there assist Burgoyne at Albany.11

The letter was itself a feint. Howe's ships disappeared in the hot July haze that overhung the ocean, and for a week nothing more was heard of him. A Connecticut newspaper printed an advertisement offering a reward for a lost general.

Washington, who had separated his army into divisions for a rapid movement, now brought his force together at Coryeirs Ferry, on the Delaware above Trenton, prepared to move quickly either to the Hudson 01 to Philadelphia ; and he ordered careful watchers to be placed along the southern coast. He could not quite believe that Howe intended to abandon Bur-

u Irving, "Washington," vol. iii, chap, xi; Marshall, "Washington," vol. iii, chap, iii; Writings of Washington, Ford edition, vol. v, p. 514. All of Howe's movements at this time will be found well described in Washington's Writings, Ford edition, vol. v, pp. 470, 522. See, also, Galloway, "Letters to a Nobleman," p. 73. Vol. II— 2 17

AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

goyne. But on the 30th of July the people living at Cape Henlopen, at the entrance of Delaware Bay, saw the ocean covered with a vast fleet of nearly three hundred transports and men-of-war ; a beautiful but alarming sight as they sailed over that summer sea and anchored in the bay.

"Washington now hurried his army to Philadelphia, and camped north of the town, near the Palls of the Schuylkill, on the line of what we have since known as Queen Lane, which runs into Germantown. This was the first appearance of the patriot army in mass at Philadelphia. Their sanitary arrange- ments, as Stewart's Orderly Book tells us, were particularly unfortunate on this occasion, and in that hot August weather a most horrible stench arose all round their camp.12

But within a day or two Howe sailed out of Delaware Bay. He decided, as he and his officers afterwards explained, that it was impracticable to go up the river to Philadelphia, because that city was defended by obstructions in the water, and the shores below were inconvenient for landing an army. Again he disappeared beyond the horizon, heading eastward, as if return- ing to New York with the intention of seizing the Highland passes on the Hudson and assisting Burgoyne by a sudden stroke.

Washington was now completely puzzled. Unwilling to march his army in the torrid heat, he held it in the unsavory camp at Queen Lane until reflection and increasing anxiety compelled him to move again towards the Hudson.

But he had not gone far when he was stopped by messen- gers. The people who lived by fishing and shooting wild fowl at Sinepuxent Inlet, below Cape Henlopen, had caught a glimpse one day of a vast forest of masts moving slowly to the southward, but quickly, as if conscious that they could be seen from the land, the masts disappeared again.

That was stranger than ever ; and Washington thought that Howe might be making for Charleston, either to occupy it or to lead the patriot army into a long march in a hot and unhealthy

* Pennsylvania Magazine of History, vol. xxii, p. 308.

18

HOWE AT THE HEAD OF ELK

climate, and, having enticed them there, return quickly in his ships to